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IF WE DON’T GET CIVIL GIDEON: TRYING TO 
MAKE THE BEST OF THE CIVIL-JUSTICE 
MARKET 
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.* 
Several years ago I served as board president of the Legal Services Cor-
poration affiliate for Durham and some neighboring North Carolina coun-
ties.  Before going to a national conference of legal-services providers for 
the indigent, I noticed on the program a panel about market approaches; out 
of interests both academic and practical, I signed up.  But for reasons un-
known to me that was the only panel, or one of very few, that got scrubbed. 
During my service it became clear to me how unlikely it is, I would 
guess even with a more liberal President and Congress, that leading sources 
of civil legal services for those unable to afford them—such as public sub-
sidy, pro bono, and law-school clinics—will ever fill more than a modest or 
moderate fraction of the perceived needs.1  Much of my academic work has 
treated various aspects of civil-justice reform, often dealing with attorney-
fee shifting2 and more broadly with civil-litigation incentives.3  This sym-
posium lets me try, by drawing on my experiences with legal services and 
prior scholarly work, to broaden my focus and consider what market-
 
*Elvin R. Latty Professor Emeritus, Duke University School of Law.  I am grateful for re-
search support received from Duke’s Eugene T. Bost Research Professorship of the Charles 
A. Cannon Charitable Trust No. 3.  I also appreciate comments on an early-stages presenta-
tion of this project by faculty at Pepperdine University School of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE 
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf (“Only a very small percentage of the legal problems ex-
perienced by low-income people (one in five or less) are addressed with the assistance of 
either a private attorney (pro bono or paid) or a legal aid lawyer.”); Deborah L. Rhode, 
Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 371 
(2004) (“[A]bout four-fifths of the civil legal needs of low income individuals, and two- to 
three-fifths of the needs of middle-income individuals, remain unmet.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Criti-
cal Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney 
Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (Winter 1984). 
 3. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a “Better 
Way”: Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation—Background Paper, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
824. 
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oriented or market-regulation approaches might be most practical and help-
ful in trying to satisfy unmet civil legal-service needs4—and to think about 
how much it appears that such approaches may be able to succeed in doing 
so.  To the extent that they likely cannot, that raises the urgency of pur-
suing the likes of civil-Gideon efforts5 and public-subsidy increases. 
I come from this angle not because of an ideological commitment to 
market approaches, nor am I suggesting unmixed reliance on the market.  
Indeed, I’d favor more public funding for, and pro bono provision of, civil 
legal services for the needy.6  Rather, I start from the premise, accepted 
with some reluctance, that we are not likely to come close to filling the 
gaps, much less adopt a quite different approach for civil legal services—
say, a broad civil version of Gideon v. Wainwright7—like the sometimes-
advocated single payer for medical care that would radically alter the calcu-
lus.  We therefore face a situation with characteristics like those that the 
Nobel-winning economist Kenneth Arrow identified several decades ago as 
distinguishing medical care from many other markets, which seem to apply 
as well to the civil-legal-services sector: service demand that is (some-
 
 4. Professor Herbert M. Kritzer, in an important article, reports findings that in several 
nations the correlation between income and retaining a lawyer appears relatively low, while 
the nature of a dispute is a much more important determinant.  Herbert M. Kritzer, To Law-
yer or Not to Lawyer: Is That the Question?, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 875, 900 (2008).  
That point hardly eliminates the significance of trying to structure markets for civil legal 
services so as to eliminate or reduce unwarranted barriers to access. 
 5. See generally Howard H. Dana, Jr., Introduction: ABA 2006 Resolution on Civil 
Right to Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 501 (2006).  The American Bar Asso-
ciation House of Delegates in 2006 unanimously approved a report calling upon 
federal, state, and territorial governments to provide legal counsel as a matter of 
right at public expense to low income persons in those categories of adversarial 
proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, 
sustenance, safety, health or child custody, as determined by each jurisdiction. 
Report to the House of Delegates, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 507, 508 (2006). 
 6. Those like me who favor more public funding and pro bono must acknowledge the 
objection that such approaches can deprive recipients of the legal services of the choice 
whether to have those services, versus money they can spend on those legal services or oth-
erwise as they prefer.  See, e.g., Charles Silver & Frank B. Cross, What’s Not to Like About 
Being a Lawyer?, 109 YALE L.J. 1443, 1481-93 (2000) (reviewing ARTHUR L. LIMAN, LAW-
YER: A LIFE OF COUNSEL & CONTROVERSY (1998) (discussing the economics of pro bono 
civil legal services)).  But the kind of change that would follow from this criticism would 
require rethinking of many other benefit schemes; Medicaid recipients, for example, cannot 
choose dollars over medical services. 
 7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding indigent defendant in state criminal prosecution con-
stitutionally entitled to appointed counsel).  One significant possibility on the national level 
may now be the relaxation of Congressional restrictions on Legal Services Corporation affil-
iates, barring them from handling class actions or claims for which attorneys’ fees can be 
awarded.  For discussion and criticism of the restrictions, see Rhode, supra note 1, at 388-
91; see generally Henry Rose, Class Actions and the Poor, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 55 (2007). 
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times) irregular and unpredictable; service supply influenced not just by 
buyers’ wishes but by suppliers’ professional judgment of clients’ needs, 
along with frequent informational asymmetry between provider and client 
about needs for, and likely consequences of, legal services; and limits, from 
educational and licensing requirements, on market entry of providers.8 
This background sets the stage for an inquiry into ways of trying to 
make the best of the civil-justice market to move toward optimal access to 
civil justice for all.  “Optimal,” of course, is a key modifier and is not the 
same as “maximum,” for other values and factors including sheer costs in a 
setting of finite-resource tradeoffs call for attention.  Also significant is the 
need for screening of weak claims and defenses: whatever the emphases of 
access proponents and litigation-explosion alarmists, both weak nuisance 
claims that are brought for their settlement value and their perhaps too-
often-overlooked flip side―obdurate defense against meritorious claims—
strike me as legitimate concerns.  So does the need to try to protect con-
sumers of legal services from exploitation and incompetence.  We also 
cannot overlook the factors of concerns for professionalism and the abiding 
existence of a considerable degree of self-regulation by the bar. 
Three final preliminary points are the limits on how much new ground I 
can break; the importance of disaggregating the types of unmet needs for 
civil legal services; and the distinction between litigation and transactional 
needs.  First, the market-oriented approaches that hold some promise have 
received considerable discussion in existing literature, on which I draw 
without purporting to add much.  The main function of this essay can thus 
be bringing together in one place, and highlighting, the leading possibili-
ties.  Second, as to disaggregating types of unmet needs: the moderate-
sized damage claim that is not worth a lawyer pursuing for a contingent 
percentage fee is one thing, and may respond to a fee-shifting measure that 
would give little or no help, say, to an indigent parent not near going to 
court yet but seeking school-accommodation measures or medicine for a 
learning-disabled or asthmatic child, or to someone in early stages of a  
landlord-tenant dispute over housing conditions.  Such distinctions can  
clarify whether various kinds of unmet legal needs seem more or less  
amenable to market-oriented approaches—and to the extent that they may 
not be, the possible need to push for greater public funding. 
Third, as for the litigation-transactional difference, of course the focus of 
this symposium is on access to legal representation in civil litigation.  Still, 
it seems useful to address both aspects.  Measures that may help with both, 
 
 8. See Arnold S. Relman, The Health of Nations, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 7, 2005, at 
23, 23-24. 
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or primarily on the transactional side, are likely to be efficiency improve-
ments that lower the cost of legal services, such as nonlawyer representa-
tion, “unbundled” legal services that involve less than full lawyer participa-
tion and partial self-representation, and Web-based legal information or 
computerized expert systems.  For litigation—in civil court cases and in 
administrative proceedings—fee-shifting policy changes might offer consi-
derable help, particularly but not exclusively on the plaintiffs’ side.9  The 
obstacles to the market-oriented changes needed to assure greater access 
may be mainly political (as they are with greater public funding), in that re-
sistance to the likes of primarily one-way pro-prevailing-plaintiff fee shift-
ing would probably be substantial.  Further, market-oriented approaches 
requiring legislation would likely require changes primarily in state law, 
meaning that a single federal law could not do the trick even if Congress 
were favorably inclined. 
One starting point, for both transactional matters and some litigation, is 
considering just how restrictive the prohibitions on unauthorized practice of 
law should be.  It would be unrealistic to advocate abolishing all profes-
sional licensing for lawyers, along with any restrictions on provision of le-
gal services by nonlawyers, and relying purely on credentialing and con-
sumer choice.  Limits on prospective clients’ information about legal-
service providers are a genuine concern and could leave them too exposed 
to exploitation and poor service.  But provisions that have the effect of 
creating a somewhat-protected monopoly on providing a range of legal ser-
vices need to be justified by true concern to protect clients from unqualified 
providers, rather than shielding lawyers from qualified nonlawyer competi-
tion.  Although competitive practices can be strong within the legal profes-
sion, and have increased in recent decades with such developments as re-
duced restrictions on attorney advertising,10 the American legal profession 
enjoys greater protection from nonlawyer competition than in some other 
nations such as England.11 
 
 9. For those with substantial damage claims, of course, the well-established contingent 
percentage fee promotes access to justice without need to adopt fee-shifting rules.  See, e.g., 
Lawrence M. Friedman, Access to Justice: Some Historical Comments, 37 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 3, 9 (2010).  But for those with smaller claims or who seek injunctive or declaratory 
relief, the contingent fee is no help. 
 10. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that the First 
Amendment generally protects attorney advertising). 
 11. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply?  A Comparative As-
sessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
129, 153-54 (2010) (discussing contrast between American unauthorized-practice restric-
tions and systems in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which “allow[] many non-
lawyer service providers”); Herbert M. Kritzer, Rethinking Barriers to Legal Practice, 81 
JUDICATURE 100, 100 (1997) (“[A]nyone in England may dispense legal advice or assist 
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Thus, a significant first area for consideration is relaxation of unautho-
rized-practice restrictions, through such measures as specialized representa-
tion by lay advocates before administrative tribunals12 and use of trained 
paralegals with limited lawyer supervision (much as the medical sector 
does a considerable amount of service-providing through physicians’ assis-
tants and nurse practitioners).13  Others, particularly Professors Kritzer and 
Rhode, have developed proposals including provision for various forms of 
regulation, which I should not repeat.14  Here, of course, the resistance of 
the bar might be a significant factor15—as might the threat of antitrust en-
forcement if restrictions were perceived to be too anti-competitive.16  But 
the obstacles to reform do not include lack of knowledge or ideas on what 
to do; we know of positive experience elsewhere and have the spadework 
done on what seem to be workable proposals. 
Relaxing restrictions on unauthorized practice could make available less 
expensive providers of legal services for both litigation and transactional 
 
with a claim pursued outside the courts.”); Rhode, supra note 1, at 409 (“Other nations gen-
erally permit nonlawyers to provide legal advice and assistance with routine documents, and 
no evidence suggests that their performance has been inadequate.”). 
 12. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice for America’s Poor in the Year 2020: Some Possibili-
ties Based on Experiences Here and Abroad, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 416-17 (2009) (dis-
cussing lay advocates in administrative proceedings); Kritzer, supra note 11, at 100-01 (re-
porting on English Citizens’ Advice Bureaus with trained volunteers handling much client 
contact, and suggesting specialized training much shorter than law school for representation 
in specific areas). 
 13. See CHRISTINE PARKER, JUST LAWYERS: REGULATION AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 112 
(1999) (discussing paraprofessionals’ ability to function more on their own than they often 
do). 
 14. For proposals to relax unauthorized-practice restrictions, see, for example, HERBERT 
M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK 202-23 (1998) (af-
ter detailed reporting on studies summarized in Kritzer, supra note 11, advocating repeal of 
unauthorized-practice statutes with possible regulation in forms of forum sanctions, legal 
liability for malpractice, and independent disciplinary bodies); Kritzer, supra note 11, at 100 
(discussing studies indicating advocacy by nonlawyers equally as good as, and sometimes 
better than, by lawyers, particularly in specific and narrow areas, and suggesting various 
types of regulatory controls); Deborah L. Rhode, Meet Needs with Nonlawyers: It Is Time 
To Accept Lay Practitioners—and Regulate Them, 82 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 104. 
 15. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 1, at 407 (“In 2001, the ABA voted to strengthen en-
forcement efforts, and in 2003 it considered a task force proposal for a stringent model defi-
nition of unauthorized practice.”). But cf. A.B.A. COMM’N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, NON-
LAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 112 
(1995) (“States should consider allowing nonlawyer representation of individuals in state 
administrative agency proceedings.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 1, at 407 (“[T]he Justice Department, Federal Trade 
Commission, and the ABA’s own antitrust division protested that the proposal would inap-
propriately restrict client choices and increase prices.”); The Associated Press, Justice De-
partment Blasts ABA Stance on Nonlawyer Services, LAW.COM, Dec. 27, 2002, http://www. 
law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1039054500927. 
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services.  So could the “unbundling” of legal services so that parties can 
pay for limited legal assistance when proceeding more or less pro se.17  But 
such an approach could call for great care—especially in litigation—to 
handle issues such as direct contact between a party with limited represen-
tation and counsel for a represented party.18  Prepaid legal insurance plans, 
sometimes provided by unions or as an employee benefit, may both reduce 
potential clients’ reluctance to consult a lawyer and sometimes provide li-
mited service in the manner of unbundled approaches.19  Further, artificial 
intelligence using expert systems may permit computer evaluation and ad-
vice, helping contain problems with the increasing amount of pro se repre-
sentation and holding out the promise of improving access by “massively 
reduc[ing] legal costs.”20 
The principal measures discussed thus far would involve a lowering of 
regulatory barriers to market competition (such as unauthorized-practice 
reform) or relying on market developments (as with efficiencies from pro-
visions of computerized expert systems).  Various other measures, involv-
ing legal tweaks influencing market actors’ incentives, should help specifi-
 
 17. See, e.g., A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., PRO 
SE/UNBUNDLING RESOURCE CENTER, available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/ 
delivery/delunbund.html; SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASS., IN RE: LIMITED ASSISTANCE 
REPRESENTATION (Apr. 10, 2009, eff. May 1, 2009) (order broadening limited-assistance 
representation from pilot trial courts to all trial courts in state), available at http://www.mass 
.gov/courts/sjc/docs/Rules/Limited_Assistance_Representation_order1_04-09.pdf; Rhode, 
supra note 1, at 419-21; John T. Broderick, Jr. & Ronald M. George, A Nation of Do-It-
Yourself Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A21 (Chief Justices of New Hampshire and 
California noting increase in pro se representation and advocating provision of "unbundled" 
legal services as now allowed in 41 states). 
  For a more radical proposal, see Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for 
Pro Se Court Reform) (Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1540763 (arguing for pro se court reform—change and simplification of proce-
dures in specialized courts, such as ones handling child-support/child-custody, landlord-
tenant, and small-claims cases, that have pro se matters as a large part of their dockets—as 
more promising approach than civil Gideon to dealing with legal problems of the poor). 
 18. See A.B.A. SECTION OF LITIGATION, MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, HANDBOOK ON 
LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE 107-13, 143-44 (2003), available at http://www.abanet. 
org/litigation/taskforces/modest/report.pdf (discussing existing approaches and calling for 
clarification of communication rules). 
 19. See, e.g., A.B.A. COMM’N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 88-91 (dis-
cussing possible benefits of and issues with prepaid legal insurance).  For further discussion 
of group legal services, see Rhode, supra note 1, at 417-18. 
 20. See AI Am the Law:  Computing: Software That Gives Legal Advice Could Shake Up 
the Legal Profession by Dispensing Faster and Fairer Justice, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 
2005, at 34, 36; Richard Marcus, The Electronic Lawyer, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 273-81 
(2009) (discussing prospects for and limits of “The Computer as Lawyer”); Nina Ingwer 
VanWormer, Note, Help at Your Fingertips: A Twenty-First Century Response to the Pro Se 
Phenomenon, 60 VAND. L. REV. 983, 1007-10 (2007) (discussing “Internet Sources of Pro 
Se Assistance”). 
ROWE CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:46 PM 
2010] THE CIVIL-JUSTICE MARKET 353 
cally on the litigation side, particularly for plaintiffs.21  To begin with ap-
proaches affecting liability for attorneys’ fees, I have long expressed skep-
ticism about broad loser-pays fee-shifting, at least outside business litiga-
tion involving more or less well-matched adversaries.  While the loser-pays 
approach could encourage strong small claims (and discourage weak ones), 
the effective strict-liability threat of down-side exposure would be highly 
likely to deter reasonable but not sure-winner claims of plaintiffs with 
modest means.22 
For tort litigation, I have developed proposals for primarily one-way 
pro-prevailing-plaintiff fee shifting, coupled with a formal offer-of-
settlement provision letting defendants try to stop the clock on plaintiffs’ 
fee entitlement and sanctions (which could be on either lawyer or client) 
for bringing or continuing baseless claims.23  Such an approach should 
have the corrective-justice benefit of providing fuller compensation to pre-
vailing plaintiffs, a goal not fully served when a contingent percentage fee 
comes out of the plaintiff’s recovery.  It ought as well to provide incentives 
for lawyers to take meritorious cases, while affording fairness and filtering 
for defendants by its offer and sanction provisions.  We more or less have 
this approach already in the civil-rights area,24 and my impression is that it 
works fairly well.  Further, of course, it can help with claims for injunctive 
and declaratory relief as well as, or even more so than, with those for dam-
ages. 
A more limited measure that is not widely used but is on the books in 
North Carolina is a fee-shifting entitlement for prevailing plaintiffs’ coun-
sel in cases recovering an amount smaller than a statutorily specified sum.25  
 
 21. In some types of litigation, such as suits for money damages, defendants’ ability to 
afford counsel is of little concern because such cases are unlikely to be filed unless defen-
dants can pay a judgment.  Cases like evictions, of course, are another matter. 
 22. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Indemnity or Compensation?  The Contract with 
America, Loser-Pays Attorney Fee Shifting, and a One-Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 
317, 329 (1998). 
 23. See id. at 334-44 (discussing details of primarily one-way pro-prevailing-plaintiff 
proposal for tort litigation).  See also 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS’ STUDY, ENTERPRISE 
RESP. FOR PERSONAL INJ. 267-316 (1991).  The Study was not a document adopted by the 
A.L.I. but was commended by its Council, the Institute’s governing body, as “a comprehen-
sive, systematic, and scholarly analysis that should occupy a prominent place in the continu-
ing discussion of tort liability.”  Statement of the Council Re: Restatement of the Law Third, 
Torts:  Products Liability, 14 A.L.I. REP., Oct. 1991, at 1. 
 24. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (authorizing award of attorney’s fee to prevailing 
party as part of costs in actions under several civil-rights statutes); Christiansburg Garment 
Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1978) (explaining reasons for difference in approaches 
to fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in Title VII litigation). 
 25. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.1 (2008) (for personal-injury and property-damage suits, 
and for suits involving unwarranted refusal by insurance company to pay claim, authorizing 
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With such claims not worth pursuing on a contingent-fee basis, some in-
centive is needed if attorney—or, for that matter, qualified nonlawyer—
involvement is regarded as desirable.  The sum should probably be a good 
deal higher than North Carolina’s current $10,000, for even significantly 
larger claims can be uneconomical to pursue without a fee shift.  And it 
seems important that fee recoveries be allowed to approximate or even ex-
ceed the recovery, at least in cases of unjustifiably strong defense resis-
tance, lest the fee incentive fall short of what would make the claims worth 
pursuing.  It is, finally, not inconceivable to render some help to access by 
providing for pro-prevailing-defendant fee shifting.  For the perhaps 
somewhat uncommon defendant who prevails in a collection or eviction 
proceeding, for example, allowing a reasonable fee award might enable 
those with strong defenses to obtain counsel rather than proceed pro se or 
default.  A 1984 survey of state fee-shifting statutes found 8.4% of 1,974 
statutes unearthed to award fees to prevailing defendants, although it did 
not give examples.26 
Other litigation-side proposals have been somewhat more theoretical so 
far.  There has been considerable academic discussion of the sale of single 
claims27 or auctions for large numbers of small claims.28  This idea is based 
somewhat on the theory that if lawyers can in effect buy a third or 40% of a 
claim or group of claims with a contingent percentage fee, should some-
one—lawyer or otherwise—be able to buy 100% of a group of related 
claims and pursue them on a consolidated basis more or less as if an assig-
nee?  Prior experience with litigation of individual and small groups of 
claims would be necessary to establish a basis for bidding.  Even defen-
dants might be allowed to bid, with the claims regarded as settled and the 
proceeds distributed to the claimants if the defendants bid highest.  There 
has also been discussion, mainly in Great Britain, of a contingency legal 
aid fund, which might be initially supported by a government stake but then 
expected to pay its own way by taking percentages of recoveries in cases it 
 
award of reasonable attorney fee when amount recovered is $10,000 or less).  Such an ap-
proach could be in addition to a broader primarily one-way pro-prevailing-plaintiff fee-
shifting scheme, particularly if fees in damage cases under that scheme were calculated on a 
percentage-of-recovery basis—which, without more, would leave many small claims not 
worth pursuing. 
 26. See Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the Ameri-
can Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 330 (Winter 1984). 
 27. See generally Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE 
L.J. 697 (2005) (discussing economic and noneconomic issues in alienability of claims). 
 28. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in 
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for 
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 105-16 (1991) (advocating experiment with auction approach 
to large-scale, small-claim class and derivative suits). 
ROWE CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:46 PM 
2010] THE CIVIL-JUSTICE MARKET 355 
supported.29  In addition, Ontario and Quebec have funds to support class 
actions, with the Quebec fund having been quite active.30 
On the transactional side, the main market-oriented hope appears to be 
with improvements to efficiency and concomitant cost reductions, several 
forms of which were discussed above in the context of measures that could 
help with both litigation and transactional matters.  Relaxation of unautho-
rized-practice rules to let qualified nonlawyers, including paralegals with 
limited lawyer involvement, aid clients by providing legal services in non-
litigation situations, is worth further exploration,31  as may be some ex-
panded use of prepaid legal services.32 
Having surveyed the possibilities, I find myself not terribly optimistic 
about the extent to which market measures of the sort discussed here can 
adequately meet the legal needs of the poor and those of modest means.33  
Particularly with transactional needs, people generally need some money to 
take advantage of even low-cost services.  It may also be a stretch to expect 
that awards in fee-shifting regimes, if they could be enacted, would be ade-
quate in comparison to market rates paid by clients with resources.  (Maybe 
I better understand now why that panel was called off, although I still think 
that the effort of working through the possibilities is worthwhile.) 
Improvements do seem possible, especially when it comes to making 
pursuit of smaller claims viable through fee-shifting measures (notwith-
standing the political obstacles to their enactment), and improved efficien-
cy through such measures as relaxation of unauthorized-practice restric-
tions and allowing unbundled delivery of legal services.  I fear, however, 
that what Professor John Leubsdorf wrote many years ago remains true: 
“Although market reforms might reduce the cost of legal services and ena-
ble indigents with valuable claims to finance legal proceedings by borrow-
ing against their claims, many poor people with perceived legal needs 
 
 29. See JUSTICE (SOCIETY), CLAF: PROPOSALS FOR A CONTINGENCY LEGAL AID FUND 1 
(1978); David Capper, The Contingency Legal Aid Fund: A Third Way to Finance Personal 
Injury Litigation, 30 J.L. & SOC’Y 66 (2003). 
 30. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Pressure on Foreign Attorney-Fee Para-
digms from Class Actions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 125, 136-38, 145-46 (2003) (dis-
cussing workings of funds in Quebec and Ontario, and proposals for similar funds in Aus-
tralia). 
 31. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14 (discussing possible relaxation of rules on 
unauthorized practice of law). 
 32. See, e.g., Molly Selvin, No Joke: Lawyers at Bargain Rates, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 
2007, at C1; supra text accompanying note 19. 
 33. See PARKER, supra note 13, at 41 (regarding it as “naive” to expect market ap-
proaches to let a majority afford needed legal services, but noting that they can help those 
with some resources to spend on legal services and when litigation can provide a source for 
fees). 
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would remain without lawyers.”34  That likelihood in turn brings us back to 
the centrality of increased funding for legal services, whether by expanded 
appropriations or some form of civil Gideon, as a major element in narrow-
ing the gaps now existing for access to civil justice. 
 
 34. John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 
1035 (1982) (citations omitted). 
